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FOREIGN FISHING PIRACY VS. SOMALIA PIRACY – DOES WRONG 
EQUAL WRONG? 
Leticia M. Diaz and Barry Hart Dubner*
This article is a sequel (and in some ways, a “prequel”) to our last article, On 
the Evolution of the Law of International Sea Piracy.1  That piece, prepared in 
April 2009, attempted to illustrate the enormous problem of sea piracy off of So-
malia.  It was updated through October 2009 and published in December 2009. 
We were invited to, and participated in, a conference sponsored by the Harvard 
Kennedy Center.  Professor Robert Rotberg, Director of the Intrastate Conflict pro-
gram at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs,2 was the coordinator for two days of intensive presentations and discus-
sions (10-12 December, 2009).  As a result of the conference, Harvard published a 
policy statement on how to combat sea piracy, with an emphasis on Somalia.3  In 
addition to your authors, the twenty-two conference panelists included individuals 
from different think tanks, the intelligence community, the U.S. State Department, 
and the military, including one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  After each session’s
panelists presented individually, we launched into discussions.  Prior to the confe-
rence, each panelist submitted a synopsis, which served to focus our discussions. 
Your authors discussed jurisdiction, sovereignty, the environment and human 
refugees who may be affected by sea piracy.   We also learned quite a bit of new 
information.  For example, one of the gentlemen present was from an African 
country.  He provided a viewpoint that was both interesting and disturbing, and 
took us back to Somalia and a way of life that existed prior to the recent surge of 
piracy in that region.  We left the conference inspired to write this article which 
sets forth a view of why Somali piracy started and some of the problems created by 
these illegal acts.  Harvard’s policy statement will speaks for itself. 
 ________________________  
* Leticia M. Diaz, Professor of Law, Dean, Barry University School of Law; J.D., Rutgers University 
School of Law, Newark (1994); Ph.D. (Organic Chemistry), Rutgers University, Newark (1988).  Barry Hart 
Dubner, Professor of Law, Barry University, Andreas School of Law, Orlando, Florida; J.D., New York Law 
School; LL.M., University of Miami, School of Law; LL.M., New York University School of Law; J.S.D., New 
York University School of Law.  The authors would like to thank and acknowledge their research assistant, Karen 
Greene, whose patience in editing, preparing, and organizing the footnotes proved invaluable. 
 1.  Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, On the Evolution of  the Law of International Sea Piracy: How 
Property Trumped Human Rights, the Environment and the Sovereign Rights of States in the Areas of the Creation 
and Enforcement of Jurisdiction, 13 BARRY L. REV. 175 (2009). 
 2. See Belfer Center Home, Programs/Projects, Intrastate Conflict Program, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/52/intrastate_conflict_program.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2010). 
 3. Robert I. Rotberg, World Peace Foundation, COMBATING MARITIME PIRACY: A POLICY BRIEF WITH 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION (2010), available at
http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/WPF_Piracy_PolicyBrief_11.pdf. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The conference at the Harvard Kennedy School, concerning the topic of con-
trolling maritime piracy, was the first such meeting that Harvard University has 
hosted since the early 1930s.  The agenda covered a range of topics, mostly related 
to piracy off the coast of Somalia.  The subjects included, inter alia: the intensity, 
spread, and economics of maritime piracy globally; the exploration of relevant le-
gal issues, including sovereignty and jurisdiction; preventing piracy at sea; prevent-
ing piracy from land; national and regional policies and strategies of the United 
States and the European Union.  A policy statement was issued after this intense, 
three-day conference. Your authors left the conference convinced that it was im-
portant to discuss certain topics that were not covered in their previous article.   
The December 2009 conference was not intended to mirror the extensive time 
that Professor Jonathan Bingham, Harvard University, spent with a group of per-
sons in creating the 1932 Draft Convention on Piracy, commonly called the “Har-
vard Draft.”4  However, in order to understand more fully the topics discussed at 
the 2009 Harvard conference, it is first necessary to backtrack and look at what the 
initial Harvard Draft accomplished back in 1932. 
As was stated in our prior article, the Harvard Draft of 1932 was prepared for 
the purposes of “expediency.”5  The study itself was extremely comprehensive and 
has been used and cited in many different texts.  In addition, most of the articles 
therein were set forth in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas6 and the 
1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)7 as articles on piracy.  
The main question at the original Harvard study considered “what initial signific-
ance does piracy have in the law of nations?”8   In contrast, the more limited sub-
ject discussed at the latest Harvard conference concerned ways to combat piracy, 
the significance being one of commercial necessity.   
The 1932 Harvard Draft, later adopted by the two conventions aforementioned, 
related to piracy on the high seas only.9  Because the crime of piracy interfered 
with international shipping on the high seas, it was thought that if the acts of piracy 
occurred in territorial or internal waters of the coastal-State, the coastal-State 
 ________________________  
 4. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, with Comment, 26 AM. J. INT’L L.
SUPP. 739 (1932) [hereinafter “Harvard Draft”]. 
 5. Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 192; Barry Hart Dubner, Human Rights and Environmental Disaster –
Two Problems that Defy the “Norms” of the International Law of Sea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 
11-12 (1997).. 
 6. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 2958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962), 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention]. 
 7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter 1982 Convention], available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
 8. Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 16; Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 749. 
 9. According to UNCLOS, “[p]iracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence 
or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship 
or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or proper-
ty on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State. . .” 1982 Convention, Art. 101, supra note 7.  The 1958 Geneva Convention includes identical lan-
guage.  See Geneva Convention, Art. 15, supra note 6. 
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could, and would want to, resolve the situation by prescribing and enforcing its 
own municipal legislation on sea piracy.10  In the Harvard Draft there was disa-
greement over whether or not piracy was “an international crime.”11  The question 
at that time was “how would we treat the problem of piracy today in the light of the 
possibility of an international agreement for suppression?”12  At that time, there 
was a “modern orthodox view” that the law of nations is a law of States only.13
Since there was no “super-government and no international tribunal to administer 
international civil or criminal justice against private persons,” and since there was 
“no provision in the law of many States punishing foreigners which political of-
fense was committed outside the State’s ordinary jurisdiction, it cannot truly be 
said that piracy are crimes or are offenses by the law of nations in a sense which a 
strict technical interpretation look at those terms.”14
The only “norm” that was demonstrated by the Harvard Draft was that a “di-
versity of opinion” existed in 1932 that was “especially remarkable with respect to 
the following fundamental matters”:
(1) The definition of piracy in the sense of the law of the nations. 
(2) The meaning and justification of the traditional assertions that 
piracy is an offence or crime against law of nations. 
(3) The common jurisdiction of all states to prosecute and punish 
pirates.15
The Harvard Draft explained that there was the “modern orthodox” view as 
well as other views on the “nature and scope of the law of nations.”16  The ortho-
dox view provided that: 
The law of nations is a law between states only, and limits the re-
spective jurisdictions.  Private individuals are not legal persons 
under the law of nations.  The rights, duties, privileges and powers 
which it defines are only those of states.  There is no legal univer-
sal society of private persons regulated by international law.17
Under the orthodox view, then: 
Pirates are not criminals by the law of nations, since there is no in-
ternational agency to capture them and no international tribunal to 
 ________________________  
 10. Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 17. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 753; Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 17. 
 13. Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 760; Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 17. 
 14. Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 756; Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 193; Dubner, supra note 5, at 17. 
 15. Harvard Draft, supra note 4, at 749. 
 16. Id. at 754. 
 17. Id.
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punish them and no provision in the laws of many states for pu-
nishing foreigners whose piratical offence was committed outside 
the state’s ordinary jurisdiction [therefore,] it cannot be truly said 
that piracy is a crime or an offence by the law of nation in a sense 
which a strict technical interpretation would give those terms.18
To the contrary, those with “unorthodox” views would conclude that: 
The law of nations is like municipal law except that it has no inter-
national governmental agencies to enforce it.  These jurists con-
ceive of the civilized states of the world as members of a veritable 
legal community, all subject to the authority of a definite legal or-
der.  Some speak of a citizenship of private individuals in this 
world community, and of international law as the law of a super-
society. Some maintain that there are international law crimes, al-
though because the international community is backward in organ-
ization, there are no agencies except those of individual states to 
punish offenders. Some of these jurists argue that there should be 
an international tribunal of justice before which private individuals 
might prosecute their claims against states and private individuals 
might be prosecuted for crimes against the international communi-
ty.  They would classify piracy as such a crime.  Indeed one jurist 
whose fundamental views on international law are otherwise or-
thodox, M. Pella of Romania, considers piracy a prototype to 
which should be assimilated in time all crimes universally recog-
nized as offenses against society. The perpetrators of such crimes, 
he says, should be punished by any state which seizes them, pend-
ing the establishment of an international court of criminal justice.19
The upshot of all this is that by 1932: 
[p]iracy lost its great importance in the law of nations before the 
modern principles of finely discriminated state jurisdictions and… 
freedom of the seas became thoroughly established.  Indeed, the 
former prevalence of piracy may be assigned as a principal cause 
of the old reluctance of states to accept the doctrine of the freedom 
of the seas.  Formerly naval powers fought pirates with little regard 
for the sort of problems which would trouble our modern world of 
intense commerce and strongly asserted national claims of numer-
ous states, and with an acquiescence of the commercial interests 
 ________________________  
 18. Id. at 756. 
 19. Id. at 752. 
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which needed protection against those dangerous common enemies 
. . .20
For example, during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), Japanese pirates plundered 
the seacoasts of eastern Asia, ranging from Korea to Indochina.21  According to 
certain sources, as early as 1223 Japanese pirates who raided the Korean coast were 
the first to be called Wo-k’ou, and such Japanese pirates were active along Asian 
coasts until the last quarter of the sixteenth century.22  As we shall see shortly when 
discussing the problems in Somalia, there were socio-political factors which caused 
the rise and spread of piracy in parts of China and related areas.23  One of these was 
the “growing influence of regionalism.”24  When the central government of China 
was effective, it was difficult for the smuggling-piratical activities to exist for a 
long time.25  But the Chi-Ching period was a far cry from other periods when the 
ruler was an autocrat and his influence could reach every nook and corner of the 
empire.26  In fact, it has been said that the “budding growth of regionalism must 
have indulged the spread of smuggling before deteriorating into piracy.”27  Another 
factor, which in the beginning was said to encourage piracy, was the terribly dila-
pidated state of coastal defense.28 “After a long period of peace, not only the origi-
nal system of coastal defense had deteriorated, but the people had also grown timid 
and averse to the art of war.”29
The persons who prepared the Harvard Draft believed that the type of piracy 
seen in Errol Flynn’s movies (and possibly off the coast of China) had died years 
before the preparation of the 1932 Draft.  An illustration of such European piracy is 
described in a book about William Dampier, a noted author and naturalist as well 
as a pirate during the late 1600s to the early 1700s.30  He described his companions 
as “privateers”;31 they were not.  Privateers at the time were “legalized” maritime 
raiders given official letters of marque in war times by governments to attack ene-
my shipping, usually in return for a cut of the proceeds, which also had to be 
shared with the ship’s owners.32  The men to whom Dampier referred were actually 
“buccaneers” – adventurers whose activities often had no legal sanction and 
crossed the boundary into out-and-out piracy, when all ships were fair game and 
the loot had to be shared with no one.33  The term “buccaneer” is derived from a 
 ________________________  
 20. Id. at 764-65. 
 21. KWAN-WAI SO, JAPANESE PIRACY IN MING CHINA DURING THE 16TH CENTURY 1 (Michigan State 
University Press 1975). 
 22. Id.
 23. Id. at 134. 
 24. Id.
 25. Id.
 26. Id. at 134-35. 
 27. Id. at 135. 
 28. KWAN-WAI SO, supra note 21, at 135. 
 29. Id.
 30. Diana Preston & Michael Preston, A PIRATE OF EXQUISITE MIND: EXPLORER, NATURALIST, AND 
BUCCANEER: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM DAMPIER (Walker & Company 2004). 
 31. Id. at 44. 
 32. Id. at 44-45. 
 33. Id. at 45. 
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French word “boucanier,” which means people who smoked or cured strips of meat 
on a frame of green sticks, or “boucan,” over a slow fire fed by animal bones and 
pieces of hide.34   Much of the piracy that occurs today off of the coast of Somalia 
is driven for financial gain35 and it is interesting to note, as we will see, if one subs-
tituted for the word “government” in the preceding definition of privateers, the 
word “mafia” or “financiers” or “terrorists” or “governmental assistants” or similar 
equivalents, one could see that the Somali pirates are actually financed, in part, by 
governmental clan people. 
Another similarity between “older” and current Somali pirates, as we will see, 
is that the Somalis claim their fishing area was destroyed by European and Asian 
fishing vessels and the environment was equally decimated by dumping.36  In the 
late 1600s, the: 
Pirate and buccaneer ships also held another ceremony unique to 
themselves:  the gallows humor of the mock trial.  With the aid of 
a few props, such as a mop for the judge’s wig and a tarpaulin for 
his robe, the sailors would expiate their forebodings by taking 
turns playing the judge, lawyer, or prisoner.  Sometimes the 
charges were ludicrous, and the humor was broad.  At other times, 
the sailors’ pleas reflected what they might have said in reality be-
fore a stern-faced judge.  Some swore they ‘came from the sea’
and so recognized no country and no authority.  Some claimed to 
be egalitarian ‘Robin Hood’s men,’ righting social wrong, others 
that they were expansionist imperialists like Alexander the Great 
and that the only differences between them was the extent of their 
conquests, not their legitimacy.37
It is apparent that while the types of piracy that the Harvard Draft referred to 
were no longer in existence, the customs and mores of classical pirates remain until 
today.  Piracy, today, comes in more shapes and forms than the usual “historical”
classical types of piracy.  Let us examine the reasons given by the Somalis for their 
despicable actions.  The “defense” of “justification” was raised at the 2009 Harvard 
conference. 
II.  DEFENSE OF THE SOMALIA PIRATES – SEA PIRACY VS. FISHING PIRACY
One of the most important items discussed at the 2009 Harvard conference was 
the devastating effect that the pirate fishing and the dumping of hazardous waste 
 ________________________  
 34. Id. at 45 n.†.
 35. Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A6, 
A10. 
 36. Michael Vazquez, Why We Don’t Condemn Our Pirates, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 12, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-vazquez/on-pirates_b_186015.html; Joann Hari, You are Being Lied to 
about Pirates, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 4, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/you-are-being-
lied-to-abo_b_155147.html. 
 37. Preston & Preston, supra note 30, at 141. 
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has had on Somalia.  Before discussing this matter, it is necessary to give a little 
historical perspective as to what is going on now in Somalia.  The decline of the 
Somali fishery sector can be traced to the 1991 Somali Civil War, as most Somali 
fisheries were shut down during that period.38
Thereafter, very sophisticated factory-style fishing vessels, designed for deep 
ocean fishing and coming from distant countries (countries often thousands of 
miles away from Somalia) started to overexploit the “rich, uncontrolled, and unpro-
tected Somali seas.”39  These fleets search Somali waters for valuable catches, in-
cluding rock lobster and high value pelagic fish.40  International demand for marine 
products has been increasing, but the Asian seas are overfished and the EU closed 
much of its fishing waters for up to 15 years in order to allow for fish regenera-
tion.41  As a result, for the last nineteen years, “fishing piracy” has consisted of 
criminal poaching and wanton destruction of the Somali marine waters.42  This 
illegal fishing is economically and environmentally damaging to Somalia.43  So, 
from the Somali point of view, while the U.N. was passing resolutions, and NATO 
and the E.E.U. were issuing decrees and orders to invade Somali seas to attack 
pirates, why did the concerned states not protect the Somali marine resources from 
violations in the same waters?44  From this viewpoint, the U.N., NATO forces, the 
European Union, Russia, Japan, India, Egypt, Yemen, and others are only concen-
trating on the safety of merchant ships, while at the same time covering up and 
protecting their own illegal fishing activities.45
Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing46 presents a serious problem 
globally, in that it does not respect the national boundaries of sovereigns; it puts an 
 ________________________  
 38. Mohamed Abshir Waldo, Somali piracy, the other side of the coin, AFRICAN PROSPECT, Oct. 2009, at 8 
[hereinafter Waldo, Somali piracy] (quoting the High Seas Task Force), available at 
http://www.exacteditions.com/exact/browse/576/929/5847/3/8?dps=. 
 39. Id.; Hari, supra note 36. 
 40. Waldo, Somali piracy, supra note 38, at 9. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.
 43. Id. at 10-11. 
 44. Id. at 11. 
 45. Id.
 46. The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (IPOA-IUU) defines IUU as follows: 
3.1 Illegal fishing refers to activities: 
3.1.1 conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, 
without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;  
3.1.2 conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fi-
sheries management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation and man-
agement measures adopted by that organization and by which the States are bound, or rele-
vant provisions of the applicable international law; or 
3.1.3 in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken 
by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organization. 
3.2 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities: 
3.2.1 which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national au-
thority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or  
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unsustainable pressure on stocks among marine life and habitats; and, it under-
mines labor standards and distorts markets.47  IUU fishing is detrimental to the 
wider marine ecosystem because it ignores the rules that are designed to protect the 
marine environment, including restrictions on the harvest of juveniles, closing 
spawning grounds, and demanding gear modifications designed to minimize by-
catch of non-target species.48  IUU fishing robs the local people of an invaluable 
protein source; ruins the livelihoods of almost all legitimate fishermen; causes 
trawlers to come into inshore areas reserved for artisanal fishing, resulting in colli-
sions with fishing boats,  destruction of fishing gear, and deaths of fishermen.49
This unlawful worldwide value of IUU catches is between USD 4 billion and 
USD 9 billion.50  If this were not bad enough, there is also a serious global “fish-
catch laundering” problem.51  Fish-catch laundering can occur through mother-ship 
factories that use uncontrolled transhipment and resupply lines at sea.52  Operations 
on this scale can keep their vessels at sea for months, refueling, resupplying and 
rotating their crews.53  Their fishing vessels never have to enter port because they 
transfer their catches onto transport ships.54  Fish-catch laundering generates hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in the black market, and they use sea ports in the Sey-
chelles, Mauritius, and the Maldives in order to launder Somali fish.55  So, histori-
cally, just before the collapse of the Somali regime in 1991, it was estimated that at 
least 200,000 tonnes of fish per year could be harvested sustainably by both arti-
sanal and industrial fisheries.56  The international fishing racket loots this area to 
3.2.2 undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management or-
ganization which have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the 
reporting procedures of that organization. 
3.3 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities: 
3.3.1 in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that 
are conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party 
to that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contra-
venes the conservation and management measures of that organization; or  
3.3.2 in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or 
management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner incon-
sistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under in-
ternational law.  
Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unre-
ported and Unregulated Fishing, ¶¶ 3.1-3.32, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/y1224e/y1224e00.pdf.
 47. HIGH SEAS TASK FORCE, CLOSING THE NET: STOPPING ILLEGAL FISHING ON THE HIGH SEAS 1 (2006),
http://www.high-seas.org, then click on documents. 
 48. Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 8. 
 49. Id.
 50. HIGH SEAS TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 1. 
 51. Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 8.  Fish-catch laundering involves mixing illegally caught fish 
with legally caught fish prior to bringing the catch into port for sale.  Id. at 8-9. 
 52. Id. at 8. 
 53. Id.
 54. Id.
 55. Id. at 9. 
 56. Id.
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the point that one scientist has put the figure of illegal taking at 300,000 tonnes of 
fish per year.57
There were also severe droughts in Somalia in 1974 and 1986, forcing many 
groups to be resettled along villages on the long, 33,000 kilometer Somali coast.58
These groups developed into large fishing communities whose livelihoods de-
pended mainly on inshore fishing.59  But when the Siad Barre Regime fell in 1991, 
the coast guard and naval services of Somalia ceased to exist.60
Deadly events followed the collapse of the Somali government.  “Local fi-
shermen documented cases of [foreign] trawlers pouring boiling water on them in 
their canoes, their nets cut or destroyed, smaller boats crushed, killing all the occu-
pants, and other abuses suffered as they tried to protect their national fishing 
turf.”61  The escalation and cycle of war in Somalia has been going on from 1991 to 
the present.  According to the High Seas Task Force (HSTF) there were over 800 
IUU vessels in Somali waters at one time during 2005 because Somalia simply 
could not patrol and control its own waters and fishing grounds.62  The fish-
poachers are estimated to take out more than USD $450 million in fish value from 
Somalia annually.63  They do not compensate the local fishermen, nor do they pay 
taxes, or any royalties.64  They do not care about management, conservation, or 
environmental regulations which are norms that are associated with regulated fish-
ing.65
These IUU fishing trawlers are mostly owned by EU and Asian fishing compa-
nies, including: Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Russia, Britain, Ukraine, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, India, Yemen, Egypt and Kenya.66  Some of them are able to obtain 
illegal or counterfeit licenses to fish and share the loot with the local warlords in 
Somalia.67  France and Spain have based fleets in the Seychelles obtaining two-
thirds of the year’s tuna catch off Somalia between August and November 2008.68
About fifty trawlers use Victoria Port, which handles up to 350,000 tonnes of tuna 
annually.69  The stocks are falling due to overfishing and no regulations.70  In 2008, 
the Somali pirates attacked tuna boats at least three times, successfully obtaining at 
least one ransom over $1 million.71  Naturally, their appetites for hunting other 
ships have increased. 
 ________________________  
 57. Id. 
 58. Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 9. 
 59. Id.
 60. Id. 




 65. Id. 
 66. Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 3. 
 67. Id. at 3-4. 
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It was brought out at the 2009 Harvard conference, that there was also serious 
hazardous waste dumping.  This includes industrial, toxic, and nuclear waste 
dumping in off-shore and non-shore areas of Somalia.72  In fact, it is so common to 
have illegal dumping that there are clips on YouTube showing where some of this 
waste has been buried.73  It is believed that the U.N. agencies and organizations 
have been fully aware of this crisis but have done nothing either to take positive 
action against these criminal activities, or to advise the U.N. Security Council of 
this tragedy before passing resolutions 1816, 1815, 1814, 1846, 1838 and 1851 on 
sea piracy in 2008.74  There is no mention of any illegal fishing piracy, hazardous 
waste dumping, or hostility of foreign vessels toward the Somali fishermen in any 
of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions.75  Some of the perpetrators of these il-
legal dumping acts have been identified, including an Italian firm (Progresso) and a 
Swiss firm (Achair Partner).76
Somalia currently has no provisions to deal with potential oil spills or other 
marine disasters and has no capability to control her coastal waters and, if neces-
sary, provide sea search or rescue operations.77  It should be noted that Somalia is 
recognized as one of the five richest fishing zones of the world and was previously 
unexploited.78  It has now been ravaged and poisoned.  In addition, the Somali 
people receive no income from this fishing resource.  While the U.S. State Depart-
ment is firm in stating that none of the illegal fishing and dumping justified the 
actions of the pirates,79 the Somali fishermen pirates believe that they are protect-
ing their fishing grounds.80  They also feel that they are extracting justice and com-
pensation for the marine resources stolen and the ecosystem destroyed by the 
IUU.81  As a possible solution to the problems it was pointed out that, first, the 
problems of sea piracy and pirate or illegal fishing must be addressed.82  This in-
cludes reviewing the national institutional crisis along with the piracy issues.83
Perhaps a joint Somali and U.N. oversight agency could oversee the Somali wa-
 ________________________  
 72. Waldo, Somali Piracy, supra note 38, at 5. See also, Hari, supra note 36. 
 73. See, e.g., People & Power: The Toxic Truth (Al Jazeera English broadcast, Jan. 17, 2009) (available on 
Youtube.com in two parts.  Part I available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ud1pQ7lGn48; Part II available 
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lM7VCIuCXI&NR=1.  Part I primarily recounts the murder of two journal-
ists who travelled from Italy to Somalia in order to investigate misuse of Italian aid funds for smuggling illegal 
arms and toxic waste into Somalia.  The last minute or so of Part I begins showing some video of dumped mate-
rials.  This video continues in the first several minutes of Part II) (last visited Feb. 8, 2010). 
 74. Mohamed Abshir Waldo, The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why the World Ignores the Other? 6, 
http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalias_twin_sea_piracies_the_global_aramada.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 
2010) [hereinafter, Waldo, The Two Piracies]. 
 75. Id. at 7. 
 76. Jonathan Clayton, Somalia’s secret dumps of toxic waste washed ashore by tsunami, TIMESONLINE,
Mar. 4, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article418665.ece. 
 77. Waldo, The Two Piracies, supra note 74, at 7 (quoting Dominic Langenbacher, UNDP Somalia Resi-
dent Representative). 
 78. Id.
 79. U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Spokesman, Setting the Record Straight: No Justification for Piracy 
off the Coast of Somalia (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/dec/133784.htm (last visited Jan. 
19, 2010). 
 80. Waldo, The Two Piracies, supra note 74, at 9. 
 81. Id.
 82. Rotberg, supra note 3, at 5. 
 83. Id. at 4-5. 
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ters.84  The most important thought was that the problem of piracy will never be 
completely eradicated unless there is a restoration of stability on the ground and 
there are effective institutions and structures in Somalia that can address the piracy 
issue in its totality.85  The actions needed and recommended by in the 2009 Har-
vard Policy Brief include taking immediate action by the international armada of 
navies against the illegal dumping and the illegal fishing in and around the Somali 
waters; the revision of Somali fisheries and environmental protection legislation 
and institutions; the strengthening of a decentralized governance and legal struc-
tures in Somalia; establishment of a regional action plan against IUU fishing and 
dumping of toxic or nuclear waste; and, more importantly, a recognition that piracy 
must be addressed from the land as well as the sea.86
Having looked at the Somali piracy and the “fishing pirates” of Europe and 
elsewhere, and having seen briefly the environment created by dumping various 
toxins, nuclear waste, etc., in Somalia, let us now turn to the other side of the coin; 
the jurisdictional problems regarding piracy.  Much of this topic was touched on in 
our prior article which was just recently published; however, certain information 
was discussed at the 2009 Harvard conference, which is worth repeating here. 
III.  JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS REGARDING SOMALI SEA PIRACY AND
OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL AND PIRATICAL ACTS FROM ELSEWHERE
According to the U.S. Department of State, Somalia’s 637,657 square miles (an 
area slightly smaller than Texas) contain 9.8 million people, 2 million of which live 
in Somaliland (one of the three provinces in Somalia).87  The per capita gross do-
mestic product in 2008 was US $600.88  The gross domestic product in 2008 was 
US $5.524 billion.89  The country is 99.9% Muslim.90  It was suggested that 706 
pirates have been encountered by war ships since August 2008.91  Of those, 411 
(58%) were caught and released.92  Two hundred sixty-nine pirates were turned 
over for prosecution.93  That represents 38% of the total.  Two hundred were sent to 
Kenya where there have been sixty-nine trials resulting in twenty-three of the pi-
rates being released.94  During this same period forty-two pirate ships were de-
stroyed.95  These numbers suggest that there is a greater problem.  It is very diffi-
 ________________________  
 84. Id. at 5. 
 85. Id. at 4. 
 86. Id. at 5. 
 87. U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Somalia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm (last visited 




 91. All Things Considered: Examining Impact of Pirate Attacks (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 28, 2009) 
(interview with Peter Pham, senior fellow and Africa Project director at the National Committee on American 
Foreign Policy), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121982547) [herei-
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cult to catch the pirates, but the question is who will try them and where will they 
be tried.  It was brought to our attention that about 1,500 pirates operate off of So-
malia at the current time.  One of the main problems is that most of the countries 
do not want to try these pirates, as this will create greater political problems for 
them at home and in the region off the east coast of Africa. 
As was shown earlier by the 1932 Harvard Draft, there have always been two 
views regarding jurisdiction and sea piracy.  The first view would say that pirates 
have always been considered enemies of mankind.  They could be tried and ex-
ecuted no matter where they were found by any nation that wishes to do so.  This 
was known as the “Universality principle.”96  A few of us at the 2009 Harvard con-
ference, your authors included, thought the best way to handle both the Somali and 
other types of piracy that could arise elsewhere, was to establish a multi-lateral 
force as well as an international tribunal to prosecute pirates.  This tribunal would 
be established by the United Nation as an ad hoc tribunal with the obligation to 
address piracy.  As can be seen in the Somalia situation, the reality is that States 
usually do not want to be delegated this authority to try and prosecute pirates and 
to enforce some type of punishment.97
Suggestions were made by a couple of us that perhaps the U.N. could set up or 
use the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, established under the 1982 
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.  This body, located in Hamburg, Ger-
many,98 only has civil authority and apparently does not have the authority to try 
pirates.99  However, the Germans, Dutch and Danes have shown no inclination to 
try Somali pirates on their shore, either because they do not wish to get involved 
because of political ramifications, or they are afraid that the pirates, having such a 
low income in Somalia, would probably want to stay in jail as it would be prefera-
ble due to the terrible economic conditions at home.   
Another thought was that perhaps a treaty could be worked out or possibly the 
IMO or the United Nations could set up this type of tribunal that would have au-
thority to try pirates. The location of the tribunal would be problematic as certain 
nearby countries, such as the Seychelles, did not express an interest in having such 
 ________________________  
 96. While most jurisdictional bases require a direct connection between the prosecuting state and the crime, 
“the universality principle assumes that every state has an interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat egregious 
offenses that states universally have condemned.”  Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under Internation-
al Law, 66 Tex. L.R. 785, 788 (1988). 
 97. In fact, several European nations have instructed their navies not to make any arrests of pirates, thereby 
avoiding the issue entirely.  See Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting 
Pirates and Terrorists 103 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 
Harvard Conference, and on file with the authors). 
 98. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, General Information – Overview, Seat of the Tribunal, 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Jan 19, 2010) (click link for “General Information,” then “Over-
view,” then “Seat of the Tribunal”).
 99. “The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in accor-
dance with [UNCLOS] and all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction 
on the Tribunal.”  1982 Convention, Annex VI, Art. 21, supra note 6.  In addition, access to the Tribunal is pri-
marily limited to State Parties.  Id. at Annex VI, Art. 20.  The Tribunal only has jurisdiction over natural or juridi-
cal persons as defined elsewhere in UNCLOS.  Id.  Such jurisdiction is granted only for disputes involving con-
tract interpretation, prospective contractors, or when a State Party sponsors the natural or juridical person and the 
UNCLOS Authority incurs liability.  1982 Convention, Art. 187(c)-(e). 
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a tribunal.100  There is already a cost-effective one in Kenya trying pirates.  The 
Kenyan government agreed to the use of their court by virtue of a couple of memos 
of understanding (MOUs) between Britain, the United States, the European Union, 
and Kenya.101  However, there are problems with this process, which will be 
touched on shortly.  Apparently, the 1982 UNCLOS has articles on piracy but they 
only cover piracy on the high seas between one private vessel and another private 
vessel.102  There is also the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA).103  It covers areas and types of 
acts not included in the 1982 UNCLOS.104  That treaty has 154 signatures, whose 
merchant marines comprise 93.45% of the world’s shipping tonnage.105  One of the 
problems with obtaining jurisdiction of pirates is that the Security Council Resolu-
tion requires that any actions taken against pirates have to comport with interna-
tional humanitarian law.106  There are real difficulties in bringing a criminal case 
against a foreigner on seas in remote parts of the world.107  For example, eviden-
tiary problems have caused the U.S. Navy to release many pirates at sea in the 
wake of the January, 2009, MOU with Kenya.108  A pirate who sees a U.S. war ship 
approaching often fears being captured, so he dumps every incriminating piece of 
evidence, including all AK-47s and other arms, overboard, so they cannot be used 
at trial.109
Another view suggests that there will still be difficulty having nations that wish 
to prosecute pirates after looking at the fact that there were 33,000 ships tran-
siting the Gulf of Aden annually, including some 65,000 tankers that carry 
seven percent of the world’s oil supply.110  Why?  The main reason seems to be 
that they are afraid that their fight will look as though white people are grouping up 
on people of color—who also happen to be Muslim.111  Denmark, for example, 
simply releases the Somali pirates after capturing them.112
 ________________________  
 100. Kontorovich, supra note 97, at 126.  The Seychelles have, however, signed a transfer agreement with 
Kenya under which pirates convicted in Kenyan courts may serve out their sentences at facilities on the Sey-
chelles.  John Ungoed-Thomas & Marie Woolf, Navy Releases Somali Pirates Caught Red-handed, TIMES 
ONLINE, Nov. 29, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6936318.ece. 
 101. We’ll Not Relent on Piracy War, Kenya to Work with Others to Protect its Tourism Sector, WORLD 
SENTINEL, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.worldsentinel.com/articles/view/128580. 
 102. 1982 Convention, supra note 7, at Art. 101. 
 103. 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988), available at http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/suppression1988.html.
 104. Unlike UNCLOS, SUA applies to acts in territorial waters, sets out acts which are considered ‘of-
fences’ and allows a State to try an individual in that State’s own courts for those offences.  Id. at 674-77. 
 105. International Maritime Organization, Summary of Status of Convention as of 31 December 2009, 
http://www.imo.org/conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). 
 106. Kontorovich, supra note 97, at 130. 
 107. Id. at 142. 
 108. Id.
 109. BBC News Archive, Pirates hit navy ship ‘in error’, BBC NEWS, 7 Oct. 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8294858.stm (last visited Jan. 24, 2009). 
 110. James Kraska, Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea 198 (Dec. 10, 
2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on file with 
the authors). 
 111. Kontorovich, supra note 97, at 145-46. 
 112. A pirate gang captured off the Somalian coast last week has been let free, THE COPENHAGEN POST 
ONLINE, 24 Sept. 2008,  http://www.cphpost.dk/news/1-latest-news/350.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The 
Netherlands recently released pirates after no country, including Kenya and the Seychelles, which both have 
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The International Maritime Organization (IMO) consists of 169 member States 
and works extensively with non-governmental organizations in the cargo and ship-
ping industry.113  The suggestion has been made that a multi-layered regional ap-
proach that includes putting pirates on trial, would work.114  Such a direction was 
taken successfully in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore although it was argued 
that a tsunami that occurred in the Aceh region of Indonesia had more to do with 
the lowering of piracy rates.115  Such a regional approach has resulted in the Nairo-
bi Report, which sought to establish better intelligence gathering including the pe-
netration of piracy groups.116  The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Soma-
lia (CGPCS) was also created, which met for the first time at the United Nations on 
January 14, 2009.117  Twenty-four countries from the EU, NATO, and the African 
Union participated in discussions to find a way to create working groups in order to 
develop collective action against different aspects (i.e. financial, etc.) of the Soma-
lia piracy.118  The International Trust Fund through the CGPCS was created in or-
der to fund the expenses associated with the prosecution of the suspected pirates.119
Against this background, your authors have been stressing for years the fact 
that there has been, and will continue to be, piracy in other parts of the globe.  So-
malia has been getting a lot of attention, and rightfully so, because of the amount of 
piracy and the amount of the ransoms being paid by various companies.  There is 
no uniform policy on paying ransom.  Right now there are approximately 260 hos-
tages who, if ransoms were not paid, could be sold to terrorists.  It was suggested 
that the best way to keep the government out of this problem would be to let the 
companies continue to negotiate ransoms.  However, others felt that we should 
have a consistent policy in treating responses to ransom demands. 
The authors believe that there are other important problems that must be consi-
dered when discussing jurisdiction as they will affect, not only the human rights, 
but also the environment. For instance, what happens if the pirates decide that they 
are tired of taking hostages and seize ships in order to put a dirty bomb on board 
and then decide it is easier to negotiate a ransom for the ship without the crew 
members?  In other words, not all acts of piracy will occur in the high seas.  A ship 
can be held for ransom in territorial waters. This raises multiple questions.  Should 
the international community be allowed to attack pirates that are holding the human 
race and its environment hostage?120  Should these countries be allowed to attack 
agreements with the European Union to help press charges against suspected pirates, would agree to prosecute 
them.  ‘Somali pirates’ held by Dutch freed, EUBUSINESS.COM, 17 Dec. 2009, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-
eu/netherlands-somalia.20n (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).  England’s Royal Navy has also released pirates “either 
because they have not been captured ‘in the act of piracy’ or because of the risk that they would claim asylum if 
prosecuted in Europe.” Ungoed-Thomas & Woolf, supra note 100. 
 113. International Maritime Organization, About IMO, Introduction to IMO, 
http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=910 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). 
 114. Kraska, supra note 110, at 203-06 (describing possible precedent for such an approach). 
 115. Id.
 116. Id. at 207-09. 
 117. Id. at 210. 
 118. Id.
 119. Kraska, supra note 110, at 210. 
 120. Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 199-200. 
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pirates in territorial waters that are about to use a dirty bomb on a ship inside these 
waters?  What if the coastal State cannot or will not attempt to stop these pirates?  
Is an attack on the environment that will destroy human life and the ecosystem not 
a crime against mankind?  We are seeking to elevate customary law concerning the 
environmental and human rights or, to put it another way: “the tendency to “find” 
new customary law based mainly on the opinio juris (i.e., statements that a legal 
rule has now been recognized) without demonstrating uniform conduct among 
states in general is especially evident in regard to human rights, environmental 
protection and economic development.”121  The issue is whether this is an “attempt 
to put new wine into old bottles legitimized by the felt necessity to extend law to 
meet social objectives, when neither treaties nor uniform practice serve that func-
tion?”122  In other words, has custom become less important in this time of perva-
sive change (as Kelson suggests)123 or has its character changed in response to ra-
pidly changing demands?  Today some writers refer to “instant custom” or to “cus-
tom on demand.”124  Instead of emphasis on uniformities of conduct (the material 
element), more importance is accorded to the subjective element of opinio juris, 
particularly when declared by states collectively with reasonable expectation of 
future conduct conforming to the new principle.125  Henkin comments: “Such ef-
forts to create new customary law by purposeful activity have included . . . resolu-
tions adopted by international organizations . . . to promote, declare or confirm 
principles of law by overwhelming majorities or by consensus resolutions which 
discourage dissent.”126 
For example, at the 2009 Harvard conference, one of the participants discussed 
two legislative bills pertaining to piracy that were submitted to the Federal Parlia-
ment of Belgium.127  This was a reaction by Belgium to one of their flagged ves-
sels, the Pompei, a stone dumping ship owned by several Belgian dredging compa-
nies, being hijacked 100 miles north of the Seychelles.128  Eventually, Belgium 
paid the ransom.129  However, Belgium also introduced a couple of legislative bills, 
one of which set forth a new definition of piracy as well as a penalty under Belgian 
penal law.130  It was pointed out that the definition of piracy in the proposed Bel-
gian legislation differs from Article 101 of UNCLOS.131  First, the bill does not 
only punish illegal acts of violence, detention, and any acts of depredation, but also 
 ________________________  
 121. LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 96 (4th ed. 1993).  
 122. See id. at 95 (citing H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 450-54 (2d ed. R. Tucker 1966)). 
Id. 
 123. Id. at 95-96. 
 124. Id. at 95 (citing H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 450-54 (2d ed. R. Tucker 1966)).  
 125. Id. at 96 (citing General course on public international law taught by Louis Henkin at the Hague Acad-
emy of International Law in 216 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY 58 (1989)).  
 126. Id. 
 127. Erik Franckx & Marco Benatar, Operation Atalanta: The European Approach to Fighting Piracy 6-9 
(Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on 
file with the authors). 
 128. Id. at 6. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 7. 
 131. Id. 
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the threat therein.132  Second, whilst Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as 
taking place in the high seas (or a place outside of any State’s jurisdiction), it ex-
tends jurisdiction of piracy to other maritime zones to the extent provided for by 
international law.133  The proposed law of Belgium adds two instances of aggravat-
ing circumstances that may warrant a higher penalty.134  The first is an attack that 
endangers navigational safety (e.g., by sailing at night with all lights turned off or 
by colliding into another ship during a chase).135  However, “[m]ore novel is the 
circumstance of endangering the environment.  This could occur when a ship emp-
ties its fuel tanks or toxic cargo in an attempt to lighten the ship during a chase.”136
In addition, the bill empowers Belgian warships to prevent and suppress piracy.137
Specifically, it enables Belgian warships to send military protection teams on board 
civilian vessels.138  The bill also stipulates certain rules of engagement.139
The second bill introduced into the Belgium legislature was intended to pro-
vide a new basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction for trying pirates in Belgium.140
This would give the Belgian courts and tribunals jurisdiction when piracy is com-
mitted against a Belgian ship or when Belgian military personnel apprehend piracy 
suspects.141  In both cases there is a link with Belgium.142  Hence, the ground of 
jurisdiction is based on the passive personality principle.143  Perhaps the most fam-
ous expression of the passive personality principle is Article 14 of the French Civil 
Code:  “L’étranger pourra être traduit devant les tribunaux de France, pour les ob-
ligations par lui contractées en pays étrangers envers des Français.”144  (“A fo-
reigner may be tried before the French courts for obligations contracted in foreign 
countries respecting the French.”)145
Those were some of the problems that were discussed regarding sovereignty 
and jurisdiction (i.e., who will try the pirates and where will they be tried are issues 
that are currently in flux). The next issue is who supplies the pirates with weapo-
nry; and, is there greater influence from terrorists, the mafia(s) or other organiza-
tions? 
 ________________________  
 132. Id.
 133. Id.






 140. Franckx & Benatar, supra note 127, at 8. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.
 143. Id. The protective principle guards the security of the central interest of the State.  The principle “as-
serts that a state may apply law . . . to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the 
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IV.  HOSTAGE TAKING FOR RANSOM AT SEA: THE MONEY VAPOR TRIAL
We know that at least 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden each year.146
The ransoms paid used to be cheaper.147  It is believed that between US $500,000 
and $2 million have been paid per ship.148  However, ransoms continue to increase.  
Just recently, owners of a Greek-flagged oil tanker paid $5.5 to $7.0 million U.S. 
dollars for release of the ship.149  If only one in 1,000 ships is hijacked (as dis-
cussed at the Conference), this would represent approximately $15 million in 
2007.150  In 2008, which was a bounty year for the pirates, an estimated $180 mil-
lion U.S. was paid in ransom money.151  That year, 111 ships were attacked, a 
200% increase over 2007.152  Two hundred fourteen ships were attacked in 2009, 
nearly doubling the 2008 number.153  The question is “where does this money go to 
and how are the pirates supplied?”  The following is a chart that was presented at 
the Conference answering this question. 
 ________________________  
 146. Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 181; About 20 Chinese rescued from pirate attack, CNN, Dec. 17, 
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/world/africa/12/17/somaliapiracy. 
 147. Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 179-80.
 148. Id.
 149. Scott Baldauf, Somali pirates fight over record ransom, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 18, 
2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0118/Somali-pirates-fight-over-record-ransom (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2010). 
 150. Karl Sorenson, Emergence of an Equilibrium in the greater Gulf of Aden? 3 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manu-
script included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard Conference, and on file with the authors). 
 151. Nick Wadhams, Drownings and Lost Ransom Won’t Deter Somali Pirates, TIME, Jan. 12, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1871204,00.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).  Participants at the 
2009 Harvard conference suggested $50 million is a fairer estimate once the lawyers’ fees and agents’ commis-
sions are stripped away.  Martin N. Murphy, Piracy as a Land-based problem 4 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript in-
cluded in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference, and on file with the authors); see also 
Sorenson, supra note 150, at 3. 
 152. Mark McDonald, For Somali Pirates, 2009 Is a Record Year, N.Y. TIMES A9, Dec. 30, 2009. 
 153. Id.
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“Predictability of Market”
After looking at the chart, one of the issues raised at the 2009 Harvard confe-
rence was whether we should say “no” when ransom is requested?  It was pointed 
out that there are 260 hostages being held, as of this writing, by the pirates.  If the 
companies did not pay off the ransoms, it is possible that the pirates would sell the 
hostages off to terrorists.  It was agreed that everybody wants to keep the govern-
ment out of the ransom game; however, it was also pointed out that the responses 
to the pirates have to be consistent.  It is important to recognize the international 
dimension of Somali piracy – a large proportion of ship ransoms flows out of So-
malia.154  In other words, go after the warlords located in Somalia, as well as the 
Russian and Italian mafias.155  The U.S. Treasury Department could possibly trace 
where funds are coming from and going to.  The big problem here, as we discussed 
in our prior article, On the Evolution of the Law of International Sea Piracy, is: are 
these pirates interacting with terrorists?156  Will terrorists eventually see that these 
ransoms could help in their various political causes?  Will they eventually become 
pirates themselves?  It is estimated that pirate attacks are underreported by fifty 
 ________________________  
 154. Patrick Lennox, Verbal Treasure Chests and Money Vapor Trails: A Financial Response to Somali 
Piracy? 4 (Dec. 10, 2009) (manuscript included in materials distributed to attendees at the 2009 Harvard confe-
rence, and on file with the authors). 
 155. Rotberg, supra note 3, at 7. 
 156. Diaz & Dubner, supra note 1, at 204-05.
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percent so that insurance companies do not raise rates even more than they already 
have. 
One of the suggestions to limit piracy was to occupy the country from which 
the pirates operate.157  An example of the French invasion of Algeria in 1830 was 
given as an effective way to root out the notorious Barbary Corsairs;158 however, an 
occupation of Puntland (another Somali Province) is not in the international com-
mittee’s political agenda.159  As we pointed out in our prior article, the shipping 
industry prefers to avoid confrontation with the pirates.160  The reasons for this 
behavior are quite clear as ransoms paid to the pirates may equal a few million 
dollars, but the actual value of the crew, cargo, and ship is much more.161  It was 
brought out that the number of attempted attacks as of the beginning of December 
2009, had already surpassed the total that occurred in 2008.162  Successful Somali 
hijackings, however, have fallen in number.163  Somali piracy, which previously 
concentrated in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast, is now occurring more 
frequently in the waters between Somalia and the Seychelles, off the Kenyan coast, 
the Red Sea, and as far away as Oman.164  It was also pointed out that Somali pira-
cy is constantly changing.165  Somalis are entrepreneurial, flexible, and adaptive –
their primary goal is making money.166  If the cost becomes too high or the task too 
difficult, the Somalis will seek another way to carry on piracy.167
Actually, paying ransoms is the least of the worries that the international com-
munity may face.  As one participant at the 2009 Harvard conference pointed out, 
Somali piracy may become a “Mujahideen at Sea.”168  It was stated that Al-
Shabaab (i.e. “the youth” – a faction in Somalia) spokespersons portray the pirates 
as “Mujahideen because they are at war with the Christian countries” defending 
“the coast of Allah’s enemies.”169  It is feared that taking the Al-Shabaab’s hint and 
ostentatiously fighting for a bigger cause in the shape of a maritime Jihad against 
the West would provide the pirates with some sort of “semi-official” sanction.170
They could demand that the Western ships withdraw from the Somali waters; oth-
erwise, they would kill hostages.171  If they view hostages essentially as a commod-
ity and the ransom money dries up, then we may find a situation in which they are 
 ________________________  
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selling the hostages to the highest bidder – Al-Shabaab or another terrorist organi-
zation.172
Let us turn to some possible solutions suggested at the 2009 Harvard confe-
rence. 
V. SOLUTIONS
Most of the attendees at the 2009 Harvard conference agreed that there should 
be short and long term solutions discussed as there are eminent problems and prob-
lems that may occur in the future.  Also, that there are two possible ways to handle 
the situation.  One emanates from the sea and the other from the land. 
A. The sea 
One suggestion was a regional-based anti-piracy patrol conducted by Arab 
States under the lead of Saudi Arabia.173  The regional approach worked in other 
areas of the world, especially the Malacca Strait where the Malacca Strait Patrol 
came into existence.174  This was a joint, anti-piracy patrol of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Royal Thai Navy vessels.175  The establishment of this type of pa-
trol has led to a reduction in the severity and overall number of piracy attacks.176
The second possible solution would be establishing an international piracy tri-
bunal.177  The third possibility is attacking the pirates’ land bases but this may lead 
to an escalation of force that is used currently.178  The fourth suggestion was the 
use of a blockade of the whole coast,179 but as Commander Mike Jager stated after 
the recent hijack of the Greek tanker Maran Centaurus: “Patrolling the whole coast 
of Somalia is like policing the East Coast of America with five police cars.”180
B. By land 
One of the greatest political problems facing the international community is the 
lack of governance in Somalia.181  What to do about that country has been a conun-
drum for nearly two decades.182  Somalia is an example par excellence of a failed 
State.  The term “failed state” really only applies to part of the country of Soma-
lia.183  Of the estimated nine million Somalis in the world, more than one million of 
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them are refugees permanently living in the Diaspora;184 3.5 million live in the Re-
public of Somaliland;185 and another 2.4 million in Puntland.186  Thus, the tempo-
rary federal government (TFG) has control over, at most, less than one-third of the 
population, all of whom live in the southern and central Somalia, and about the 
same proportion of the former national territory.187  The self-proclaimed “Republic 
of Somaliland” and north-western coast of the former Somali State shows what is 
possible when a “bottom-up” or “building-block” approach is allowed to take place 
instead of imposing the favorite “top-down” strategy for resolving conflicts, conso-
lidating peace and stability within a political space.188  The British Protectorate of 
Somaliland gained its independence and became the State of Somaliland on June 
26, 1960.189  Less than a week later, it merged with a former Italian colony of So-
malia in the south and east.190 The union with Somalia was regretted almost from 
the beginning as they faced increasing modernization within both government and 
civil society at the hands of a numerically superior seven clansman.191  By the 
1980s, full force civil war was underway as Siyad Barre issued measures to sup-
press the Somali National Movement, which was the primary opposition in Soma-
liland, and represented the aspirations of the various Isaq clans in particular.192
All of the piracy occurs in Puntland.193  In 1998, tired of being held back by the 
constant violence and overall lack of social and political progress in central and 
southern Somalia, traditional clan allies of the Darod clan family’s Harti Clan –
including its Dhulbahante, Majeerteen, and Warsangeli sub-groups – meeting in the 
town of Garowe, decided to establish an autonomous administration for Puntland 
State, Somalia.194  Unlike Somaliland which asserted its independence, Puntland’s
constitution simultaneously supports the notion of a federal Somalia and asserts the 
region’s rights to negotiate the terms of any event of national government.195
The aforementioned very brief description of Somalia can be summed up as 
basically a stateless or lawless country.  Piracy is a crime from the land.  Before 
any long-term solution can be reached, there must be stability in all of Somalia.  
Piracy exploits the anarchy and the wilderness that is the sea but it does so in re-
sponse to seven factors including, inter alia: 1. opportunity for reward; 2. favorable 
geography; 3. permissive political environment; 4. inadequate securities/law en-
forcement; 5. conflict and disorder; 6. cultural acceptability/maritime tradition; 
and, 7. legal and jurisdictional opportunity.196  Historically, pirates have been con-
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sidered everything from criminal to fighters for liberty.197 Their’s might be consi-
dered a legitimate way of earning a living.198  Their way might be considered a 
normal societal activity.199  For example, the Barbary coast, the Jolo or Sulu pirates 
of the Philippines, who used the notorious “pirate wind” to raid communities else-
where in the region, or the historic Japanese and Chinese pirates mentioned earlier 
in this paper.200
VI.  THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
One may ask, “is there any international, or even United States policy, about 
dealing with pirates?”  The answer that was suggested at the 2009 Harvard confe-
rence was “yes!”   Fifty-Eight percent of the pirates are released, as we stated earli-
er, and this is considered a “default” policy.201  There are believed to be 150,000 to 
200,000 militia in Somalia.  One of the main questions confronting the various 
countries who are affected by piracy off of Somalia is “how do you harmonize your 
responses?”  For now, U.S. responses are inadequate because the United States has 
other problems in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Just the sheer size of the areas involved is 
discouraging.  NATO uses a checklist for what to do when pirates are captured and 
where they should be transferred for trial. 
Another main problem is the vulnerability of ships today.202  Due to inefficien-
cy, cost-cutting, and the great world recession, there are sub-standard ships being 
used.203  Quality ships are not being hijacked.204  They move too quickly (i.e. 
around 22 knots).205  The sub-standard ships are referred to as “ships of shame” by 
the trade.206  Many ships are idle due to the global financial crisis.207  In addition, 
the size and the wages of crews are reduced drastically.208  In addition, flag-of-
convenience states are also at fault because they do not care if their flagged vessels 
meet the minimum standards of safety and maintenance.209
In the short term, we are looking at NATO as an interim solution.  In the me-
dium term, we are looking at the regional approach as we mentioned earlier in the 
paper.  In the long term, we are looking and hope to establish law in Somalia and 
other places where piracy may erupt. 
Other problems include whether or not armed sailors should be placed on 
board ships that are sub-standard.  The richer ships can do over 20 knots and usual-
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ly pirates do not attack ships travelling over 20 knots.210  The argument is that if we 
arm sailors, then there may be problems with the sailors killing each other, they 
may have inadequate training, or it may lead to an escalation of violence at sea 
between the pirates and the ships they seek to hijack. 
VII. CONCLUSION
The 2009 Harvard conference discussed all of the aforementioned items.  Your 
authors are still concerned about piracy occurring in other areas and taking differ-
ent forms of violence as violence may affect far more than one ship at a time.  We 
have mentioned the scenario where pirates decide to put a dirty bomb on a ship that 
has been hijacked and use that as ransom rather than the hostages.  It may be to 
their benefit to do this as there will be fewer problems dealing with hostages.  
However, the other problem concerns the damage that will be caused to the envi-
ronment and various ecosystems if pirates decide to hijack a ship and then blow it 
up in a very sensitive environmental region.  The same is true with human refu-
gees.  As we stated in our last article, there may be many millions of refugees due 
to a decline in the amount of potable water, and these refugees will certainly be 
attacked by pirates who are actually primarily fishermen, as occurred earlier on 
during the Vietnamese refugee attacks.     
The second item that comes to mind is the fact that we have only been discuss-
ing piracy on the high seas.  We believe it will be necessary for the regions to allow 
ships to go into territorial waters where either the country does not wish to, or is 
unable to, go after the pirates. There may not be time for Security Council Resolu-
tions if the pirates intend to blow up the ship or kill many refugees.  The Harvard 
Draft of 1932 clearly set forth articles permitting hot pursuit into territorial waters 
to stop pirates from using the territorial waters of another country as a hiding place.  
However, due to reasons of expediency (which was explained in our last article), 
the international community decided to adopt the piracy articles set forth in both 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the current UNCLOS 1982.211
If the international community needs long-term solutions it seems to us that an 
international tribunal will have to be set up to handle the situation.  It will have to 
be located in a neutral place, which will not affect any local inhabitants who would 
be biased against Muslims or Christians or whoever is involved in the situation.   
Perhaps it could go out on “circuit” holding court in different places.  In other 
words, there are many problems that may occur due to an outgrowth in piracy.  
Currently we have the SUA in effect to cover those areas (other than high seas) 
where the UNCLOS 1982 does not apply.  However, that treaty is not really a solu-
tion to anything other than terrorist attacks such as those that occurred on the 
Achille Lauro earlier on. 
The international community must confront these situations and deal with them 
both from the land from which they arise (e.g., Somalia) and from the sea.  The 
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main theme of UNCLOS 1982 was the “common heritage of mankind.”  Through-
out our discussions at the 2009 Harvard conference, it was apparent that all persons 
present were interested in preserving civility, even though force might be neces-
sary.  We hope that the international community keeps up with the current events 
and possibly plans ahead for more scenarios. 
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